Lost Jobs by Robert E. Hall
ROBERT  E.  HALL 
Stanford University 
Lost Jobs 
THE  LOSS of a job  can be a significant economic  event.  When an em- 
ployer  discharges  a worker permanently,  the worker may take many 
months to find a new job. The new job often pays lower wages,  and the 
worker faces a much higher likelihood of discharge from a new job than 
from an established job.  It may take several  years for a worker to be 
back on the career path interrupted by the original discharge. However, 
many job losses  are routine. They occur, for example, when a construc- 
tion  project  is  completed  and the  workers  disperse  to  look  for  new 
projects. 
This paper takes a broad look at the economics  of job loss  and the 
many sources of data that expose  different aspects of the flows of work- 
ers out ofjobs  and back into them. One major goal is to describe the inci- 
dence  and consequences  of job  loss.  It also builds the analytical case 
that brief, sharp episodes  of primary job loss  are followed  by long pe- 
riods of slowly  rebuilding employment  relationships  over the business 
cycle.  Although the case is far from complete,  I believe that these events 
in the labor market play an important part in the persistence  of high un- 
employment  and low output long after the initial shock that triggers a 
recession. 
The paper begins with a discussion  of the economic  fundamentals of 
job  loss.  The analysis  focuses  on two polar cases.  In the first, all job 
losses  are  efficient.  A  discharge  occurs  because  the  employer  and 
worker, considered jointly, are better off if the worker finds anotherjob. 
In  other  words,  the  employment  relation  terminates  because  the 
worker's  marginal product in another job  is enough higher than in the 
current job to pay for a period of job  search.  In the model of efficient 
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employment relationships,  the wage is the way that the two parties split 
the joint value from the relationship; it plays no role in terminating the 
job. In the second case, by contrast, the contractual wage does matter- 
termination is governed by calculations  made by both parties involving 
a predetermined wage.  The employer  discharges  the worker if the dis- 
charge raises the employer's  own value; that is, if the worker's marginal 
product is below  the contracted  wage.  A discharge  that reduces joint 
value  will  occur  if the contract  wage  exceeds  the worker's  marginal 
product at the firm but the best alternative job pays less than that mar- 
ginal product. In the second  case,  institutions  and practices  have suc- 
ceeded in suppressing the renegotiation of employment terms that seem- 
ingly ought to occur when an inefficient termination looms.  A model of 
the labor market with suppressed  renegotiation  appears to be the best 
way  to  describe  what  macroeconomists  have  loosely  called  wage  ri- 
gidity. 
A labor market with suppressed renegotiation will have larger flows 
of workers out of jobs  than does a market with ideal, efficient employ- 
ment relationships. Although I strongly suspect that the high rates ofjob 
termination in the United States and similar economies  are the result of 
suppression  of renegotiation,  it would be an overstatement  to suggest 
that the evidence  in this paper proves that hypothesis. 
The empirical issues  relating to job loss fall naturally into two cate- 
gories: the incidence ofjob loss and its consequences.  I look at a number 
of direct and indirect measures of the incidence,  that is, the flow of ter- 
minated workers, and focus on an informal reconciliation of the extreme 
differences  in termination rates in the various  measures.  Comprehen- 
sive data on flows including the briefest jobs reveal flows of permanent 
layoffs at quarterly rates of 17 percent. Data on gross reductions in em- 
ployment by establishment show quarterly flows of almost 6 percent. On 
the other hand, retrospective  data from the Census Bureau's  survey of 
displaced  workers  on the incidence  of job  loss  in the preceding  three 
years show rates of about 0.6 percent per quarter. The discrepancies  ap- 
pear to come  from a small number of workers  and occupations  with 
intrinsically high turnover (such as the construction example noted ear- 
lier), together with the different interpretations that respondents gave to 
the questions in the displaced workers survey relative to those in the es- 
tablishment survey. 
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on postdischarge unemployment and earnings histories. The data reveal 
large amounts of job search for job losers.  Most of the consequences  of 
job loss on workers' earnings in the first year come from lost work rather 
than reduced earnings. Although job losers are almost back to their nor- 
mal annual weeks  of work two or more years after a job loss,  for four 
years or more their wage rates remain below the levels  of their counter- 
parts who have not suffered job loss. 
There is a conspicuous  trade-off between  the definition of incidence 
and the  measure of consequences.  If a broad definition of job  loss  is 
used-for  example,  any worker who is counted as unemployed because 
of a permanent layoff-the  average consequence  ofjob  loss will be rela- 
tively small because the flow ofjob  losses  includes so many cases  of the 
normal termination of intrinsically short jobs.  On the other hand, with a 
more stringent definition ofjob  loss,  such as the type of loss reported in 
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics  (PSID),  the consequence  of each 
loss is much larger. To put it differently, it appears that the stringent dis- 
placed workers concept used by the Census Bureau captures most of the 
total earnings loss  even  though it captures only a small fraction of the 
incidence  of loss.  The omitted job losses  are the ones with smaller con- 
sequences. 
I am careful to refer to the consequences  of job loss,  not the costs. 
Identifying avoidable job losses  is challenging.  This paper provides the 
tools for measuring the costs of the extrajob losses  that go with an avoid- 
able recession,  if there is such a thing. The costs of suppressed renegoti- 
ation, that is, the extra unemployment and earnings loss associated  with 
inefficient job loss,  might also be measured. But there is a presumption 
that the suppression  of renegotiation has offsetting benefits in employ- 
ment relationships. 
The paper next turns to the aggregate implications  of the microeco- 
nomic findings about the experiences  of job  losers.  I make inferences 
about the aggregate importance ofjob search within a model where labor 
demand is stable and highly wage-elastic.  The initial shock that causes a 
burst of primary  job loss may involve a transitory shift in demand, but I 
hypothesize  that demand returns to normal soon after. In this setting, 
the downstream pattern of job search will explain the dynamics of em- 
ployment following a shock. Traditional macroeconomics  has made the 
opposite assumption-that  labor demand remains below normal for sev- 
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that case,  findings about the dynamics of labor supply would be irrele- 
vant to the dynamics of employment.  Slumps would be periods of job 
scarcity, and employment would track demand. 
I make the working assumption that bursts of primary  job losses-the 
initial loss of longer-term jobs-can  be measured by gross employment 
reductions. I document the timing of the downstream effects of primary 
job losses  in the labor market by showing the distributed lag relationship 
between  primary losses  and the  onset  of  unemployment  spells.  New 
spells of unemployment are at abnormal levels  as much as two years af- 
ter the burst of primary losses.  Losses  of explicitly  temporary jobs and 
the failure of new job matches appear to be major factors in the down- 
stream effects. 
Simple Markoff-style  models of labor market transitions fail to cap- 
ture the lingering effects  of a burst of primary job losses.  Average job- 
finding rates are so high that a simple Markoff model returns to its sto- 
chastic equilibrium much too quickly to help explain the persistence  of 
high unemployment  following  a recession.  I explore  how much of the 
persistence  can be explained in a more elaborate model that is faithful to 
most of what is known about the duration of employment. 
The data appear to support a general picture of the role of the employ- 
ment relationship in aggregate fluctuations. During cyclical contractions 
there is a sharp burst of primary job losses.  Data on gross employment 
reductions show that plant closings and other sources of primary  job loss 
reach sharp peaks in recessions.  The after-effects  of the job losses  are 
seen in the labor market and the economy  as a whole for several years. 
Much time is spent reassembling productive,  long-term uses for the tal- 
ents of the workers who lost their jobs in the initial burst. 
I conclude by constructing a time series for the value associated  with 
significant job loss on the conceptual  basis of the PSID,  using the flow 
data from the gross employment  reductions.  It remains an unresolved 
question  whether  stabilization  policies  could  avoid  the  costs  of job 
losses  that are concentrated  in recessions.  Some of the plants or units 
shut down might remain open permanently absent a recession,  but oth- 
ers  might need  to  be  closed  at  another  time,  anyway.  Some  of  the 
worker-job matches might be preserved with different employment  ar- 
rangements,  but others might be terminated under almost any reason- 
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Figure 1.  Efficient Retention and Separation 
Marginal  product  at firm 
450 line 
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Theory  of Termination 
The  basics  of  the theory  of job  termination are well  developed  in 
labor economics.I  A core  question  is the efficiency  of terminations- 
efficiency,  as usual, means the maximization ofjoint value. Figure 1 dis- 
plays the analysis  of efficient terminations.  The horizontal axis shows 
earnings  available  from the  next-best  job  in the  open  market,  net  of 
search  costs.  The vertical  axis  shows  the worker's  marginal product 
with the current employer.  Separation should occur below the 450 line. 
Whether the separation is initiated by the worker as a quit or by the em- 
ployer  as  a  layoff  depends  on  the  details  of  the  employment  ar- 
rangement.2 
1.  See, for example, Hashimoto and Yu (1980), Hall and Lazear (1984), and McLaugh- 
lin (1991). 
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Efficient separations would be likely if the variables in figure 1 were 
observed  by the employer and the worker. For example,  if the worker 
can locate the best possible  outside  wage offer costlessly,  and the em- 
ployer can verify the offer, then the employer  will match the offer and 
retain the worker if the offer is below the worker's marginal product, and 
let the worker accept the offer otherwise.  This arrangement does not re- 
quire the marginal product to be observable.3 
When neither party can verify the other's data, efficiency  is more of 
a challenge.  Any provision in the employment contract granting the em- 
ployer the right to lower compensation  after a worker has accepted  em- 
ployment  and made job-specific  investments  will invite  opportunistic 
wage cuts.  Even when demand has truly fallen and renegotiation of the 
terms of employment  is appropriate to retain the worker efficiently,  the 
worker will not be able to verify that the employer  is not trying to de- 
prive the worker ofjob-specific  rents. Suppression of renegotiation may 
be an important feature of employment arrangements. 
Choice  of Form  of Employment  Governance  in a Free  Market 
Absent  legal  prohibitions  of  certain  types  of  employment  gover- 
nance,  the employment  relationship  would  be expected  to  evolve  to 
maximize the joint value achieved by employers and workers. In princi- 
ple,  this  proposition  should  apply  whether  the  employer  or the  em- 
ployee,  or both,  have market power.  Maximization  of joint  value will 
occur subject to the constraints of limited abilities to observe  or verify 
key measures,  and the inability of many workers to borrow against fu- 
ture earnings. 
The simplest form of employment arrangement is a term job. The em- 
ployer pays a wage and the worker provides  services,  both specified in 
advance.  Once the term has expired, the job is over and termination oc- 
curs automatically. The evidence  in the next section suggests that many 
jobs  take this form, although only a small minority of workers are em- 
ployed  this way.  Term employment  maximizes joint value when work 
effort is observable  by the employer,  and when there is no job-specific 
capital. 
3.  Hall and Lilien (1979) discuss  efficient employment  arrangements with unilateral 
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Most jobs do have specific capital. Workers develop  skills related to 
the employer's  particular way of doing business.  They develop personal 
relationships with their coworkers.  They may choose  places to live, and 
particular houses,  based on their employer's  location.  Firms accumu- 
late valuable  knowledge  about their workers'  skills.  More  subtle em- 
ployment  practices  may be needed  to protect  investments  in specific 
capital. 
Still, a simple term contract of adequate length may be enough to pro- 
tect the specific capital of a job match. When there is little chance that 
conditions will change in a way that makes the match inefficient, the par- 
ties may simply agree that the job will last until retirement, with a prede- 
termined wage. The worker receives  the appropriate incentives  to make 
many of the job-specific  investments just listed, and the employer earns 
the return on any training or other investment.  Without additional con- 
tingencies,  the term contract cannot provide an incentive  to the worker 
to make job-specific  investments  after starting work. 
When the efficiency of continuing the match is a live issue, protection 
of specific investments  becomes  a serious challenge.  In that case,  some 
kind of joint or unilateral procedure is needed  to determine if a match 
should continue.  If either party has the power to end the job (the worker 
to quit, or the employer to terminate), one party can use that power to 
deprive the other of the expected  return to its investment.  For example, 
an employer might attract a worker to make an expensive  move by offer- 
ing a high salary. A year later, the employer might approach the worker 
and say that the worker would be terminated unless the worker accepted 
a much lower salary. The worker would accept the reduction as long as 
the salary remained above  the value of the next-best job,  which might 
involve  another expensive  move.  An employment  arrangement can in- 
clude severance  pay to limit this type of opportunistic behavior by em- 
ployers. 
The fullest elaboration of the theory of the employment  relationship 
along the lines of this discussion  is found in the work of Charles Kahn 
and Gur Huberman.4 In their model,  the worker's  productivity  is ob- 
served only by the employer,  but depends on an investment  in specific 
capital observed  only by the worker. Absent both of these  information 
limitations,  simple contracts  would give the first-best outcome.  If pro- 
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ductivity were verifiable, then the wage would be contingent on actual 
productivity, and the worker would have the right incentive to make the 
investment.  If  the  investment  itself  were  observable,  the  employer 
would reward the worker for making it. But in the presence of these limi- 
tations,  the following  more complicated  contract delivers  the efficient 
outcome: the parties agree in advance on a wage to be paid after the in- 
vestment  is made. Upon observing  the worker's  productivity,  the em- 
ployer can either keep the worker and pay the wage,  or discharge the 
worker. The worker does  in fact make the investment  and is retained, 
which is the efficient outcome. 
Although Kahn and Huberman do not stress the point,  suppression 
of renegotiation  is central to the  success  of  their contract.  After the 
worker has made the firm-specific investment,  the employer could say, 
"If I have to pay you the wage we agreed upon, I won't keep you. But if 
you agree to a lower wage, I will keep you." There is no violation of the 
contract in this offer. But if the worker anticipates that the employer is 
free to make this offer, the worker will not make the investment and the 
scheme will fail. 
Considered  as a game played only once,  the Kahn-Huberman con- 
tract fails the test of credibility (it is not subgame perfect).  Suppression 
of renegotiation requires the employer to commit not to take a step that 
would be rational later and is permitted under the terms of the contract. 
The problem is the same as the one  studied extensively  by monetary 
economists  (a central bank needs  some way to commit not to create a 
monetary surprise, even  if such a surprise would be rational later) and 
in public finance (tax authorities need some way to commit not to levy a 
capital tax, even if such a tax is the ideal, neutral lump-sum tax later).5 
The concept of reputation is one promising way to make the suppres- 
sion of renegotiation  credible.  If an employer  is expected  to remain in 
business permanently, it will pay for it to develop a reputation for adher- 
ing to policies  of not renegotiating.  This concept  can be explained  in 
models of games of repeated play and other frameworks.6 
Suppression of renegotiation also seems to be an important part of the 
cultural norms of the labor market. The offer to retain an employee  by 
changing previously  announced  standards of compensation  is seen  as 
5.  See Fischer (1980). On the general issue of the value of commitment in games,  see 
Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, pp. 74-77). 
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morally wrong. Standards of ethical conduct  support up-or-out rules in 
universities  and professional  practices.  It is  wrong  to  extend  a non- 
tenured  faculty  member's  appointment  after  denial  of  tenure,  even 
though both sides might favor it.7 
Truman Bewley's  extensive  field study of employment  relationships 
in a depressed  local labor market documents  the absence  of renegotia- 
tion.8 By far the most common reason given by employers and their ad- 
visers for not rewriting employment  arrangements in order to preserve 
jobs is that lowering wages would destroy morale. In other words, work- 
ers see a departure from established  compensation  patterns as a viola- 
tion of the rules of the workplace.  They endorse the principle that em- 
ployers  unwilling  to  pay  promised  levels  of  compensation  should 
discharge their workers. 
Suppression  of  renegotiation  has  some  of  the  implications  of  the 
types  of wage rigidity considered  in macroeconomics.  But it does  not 
explain any failure of the labor market to clear. Since it puts no restric- 
tion on the terms under which new workers are hired, it is completely 
consistent  with market clearing in the market for new  hires.  Figure 2 
shows  that suppression  of  renegotiation  results  in excess,  inefficient 
separations.  Suppose that the worker was hired with the understanding 
that the wage would be w. The firm has the right to terminate the worker 
if the wage falls below w, and the worker has the right to quit if there is 
an alternative job paying more than w. The standard for efficiency  re- 
mains as in figure 1 and does  not involve  the contract  wage.  Figure 2 
shows that a separation will always occur if the match has become  inef- 
ficient. In the area below the 450  line, where employment  is inefficient, 
either a quit will occur (the triangle at the top right) or a layoff will occur 
(the triangle at the lower left), or both quits and layoffs will occur (the 
lower right quadrant). The suppression of renegotiation also permits the 
destruction of efficient matches,  however.  When conditions are good in 
the outside market, relative to the contract wage, but are even better at 
this employer  (the triangle at the upper right above  the 45? line),  the 
worker quits even  though the two parties could renegotiate  to mutual 
7.  Gilson and Mnookin (1990) argue that the up-or-out rule common in law firms is the 
result of suppression of renegotiation.  In order to induce associates  to make firm-specific 
investments,  the firm promises not to offer the associate  a salary just above the best out- 
side salary. Instead, at a predetermined time, the firm chooses  between  offering partner- 
ship or terminating the associate. 
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Figure 2.  Wage Contract with Suppression of Renegotiation 
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advantage-there  is a wage that will keep employment profitable for the 
employer and also exceed  the worker's best alternative wage. 
At the far lower left in figure 2 is the case  of greatest interest to this 
paper. An inefficient layoff occurs when conditions  are bad at the firm 
but even  worse  in the outside  market. The parties fail to renegotiate  a 
wage reduction,  even though a mutually beneficial one is available.  Fi- 
nally, the upper left quadrant describes a success  for the contract; reten- 
tion is efficient and it actually happens. 
Government  Intervention 
The employment  arrangement is, in many respects,  a contract inter- 
preted within the appropriate law established  by the government.  One 
of the constraints under which joint value-maximizing  employment  ar- 
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contracts.  For example,  rarely would  a country's  laws  require that a 
worker continue to work for an employer against the worker's will. 
The modern theory of the employment  arrangement emphasizes  the 
value-enhancing role of granting the employer the unilateral right to ter- 
minate the employment  relationship.  Yet in many countries,  including 
those of continental Europe, the law dramatically limits the employer's 
right to terminate. Either termination is simply forbidden, or large sever- 
ance payments  are prescribed.  Theory  suggests  that these  restrictions 
lower joint value and thus lower productivity.  In addition, the restric- 
tions probably reduce the flow of terminated workers through the labor 
market. As far as I know, in the United States the only nationwide limi- 
tation on termination is a recent federal law requiring advance notice of 
plant closings.9 
In the United States there has been a growing tendency  to interpret 
unwritten employment  arrangements as if they were formal contracts. 
A terminated worker may be entitled to compensation  for damages in 
the same way as is a supplier of goods  and services  when a purchaser 
breaches a contract.  Under certain conditions,  the standard legal rules 
for calculating damages lead to efficient breaches,  so the movement  to 
formalize labor contracts  is not inefficient on its face. 10  However,  as a 
general matter the employment arrangement does not satisfy the condi- 
tions for efficient  breach."  The long-run effect  of granting terminated 
workers  the right to sue their employers  is probably no more than to 
cause  employers  to provide a more detailed  written statement  of em- 
ployment policies  when the workers are hired. In California, the courts 
have  held  that a written  agreement  making employment  "at will" is 
enough to recreate the standard traditional arrangement under which the 
employer has the free right to terminate. In this setting, the written em- 
ployment policy should evolve  to maximize joint value in the same way 
as would occur in other markets. I conclude  that trends in government 
intervention in the U.S.  labor market are not likely to have much effect 
on observed flows ofjob  losses. 
9.  Discriminatory terminations are illegal as well, of course. 
10.  See Polinsky (1983) for a lucid discussion  of efficient breaches. 
11.  In the  vocabulary  of  contract  economics,  as  in Polinsky  (1983),  protection  of 
match-specific capital calls for damages on the basis of reliance, while efficient separation 
calls for damages on the basis of expectation.  The two measures cannot be combined, as a 
general matter. 232  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
Table 1.  Alternative Measures of Job Loss, Quarterly Rates 
Percent 
Rate  of 
Measures  job  loss 
Permanent separations,  Ul  system  dataa  17.23 
CPS tenure survey,  1981  b  10.04 
All separations,  CPSC  8.29 
Gross employment  reductionsd  5.66 
Permanent layoffs,  PSID,  1985e  1.81 
Displaced  Workers Survey,  all workers,  199l-93f  0.61 
Displaced  Workers Survey,  workers on the job for at least 3 years,  1991-939  0.59 
Sources: 
a.  Anderson  and  Meyer  (1994,  table  2).  Measured  directly  from  unemployment  insurance  records. 
b.  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics  (1983,  table  1,  p.  1).  Fraction  of  workers  on  the  job  for  six  months  or  less,  stated  at 
quarterly  rate  (unadjusted  rate  is  18.2  percent  per  six  months). 
c.  Blanchard  and  Diamond  (1990,  figure  1).  Average  monthly  flows  out  of  employment,  1968-86,  divided  by  civilian 
labor  force  for  1977  (Economic  Report  of  the  President,  1995,  table  B-33),  stated  at  quarterly  rate  (unadjusted  rate 
is  2.7  peicent  per  month). 
d.  Davis,  Haltiwanger,  and  Schuh  (1995,  table  2.1)  using  the  Longitudinal  Research  Database  (LRD).  Quarterly 
flow  of  "job  destruction"  in  manufacturing,  with  adjustment  for  compounding  (unadjusted  rate  is  5.5  percent  per 
quarter). 
e.  Topel  (1990,  figure  1).  Annual  frequency  of  job  loss  from  employer  going  out  of  business,  layoff  or  firing,  and 
completion  of  job  reported  in  PSID,  stated  at  quarterly  rate  (unadjusted  rate  is  7.0  percent  per  year). 
f.  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics  (1994,  table  8).  Total  number  of  workers  displaced  between  January  1991  and 
December  1993,  divided  by  the  civilian  labor  force  for  1992  (Econiomic  Report  of  the  Presidenit,  1995,  table  B-33), 
stated  at  quarterly  rate  (unadjusted  rate  is  7.1  percent  per  three  years). 
g.  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics  (1994,  table  1).  Number  of  workers  with  tenure  of  at  least  three  years  displaced 
between  January  1991  and  December  1993,  divided  by  the  civilian  labor  force  for  1992  (Economic  Report  of  the 
Presidenit,  1995,  table  B-33),  divided  by  the  fraction  of  the  labor  force  with  tenure  of  at  least  three  years  (51.5 
percent)  (Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics,  1983,  table  1,  p.  1),  stated  at  quarterly  rate  (unadjusted  rate  is  6.8  percent  per 
three  years). 
Incidence and Consequences  of Job Loss 
Many different measures  of the incidence  of job  loss  are available, 
spanning a wide range of rates of loss. Table 1 presents a selection of the 
measures,  arranged with the highest rates first. Almost all of the differ- 
ences in the rates result from conceptual differences,  not from measure- 
ment error. All of the measures are standardized at quarterly rates with 
adjustments for compounding (if the original rate is s, measured over T 
quarters, the standardized measure is  -  lIT log (1 -  s)).  The standard- 
ized measure is interpreted as the instantaneous flow rate of separation, 
stated at a quarterly rate. 
The  administrative  records  of  state  unemployment  insurance  sys- 
tems  provide  one  of the most  comprehensive  measures  of job  loss.'2 
12.  Anderson and Meyer (1994). All separations are measured, so the rate is instanta- 
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Losses  of permanent jobs can be distinguished from losses  of temporary 
ones,  but no distinction is made between  quits and layoffs.  Each quar- 
ter, the total number of departures from jobs  is  17 percent of employ- 
ment.  People  whose  work  intrinsically  involves  frequent  movements 
among employers  contribute  large numbers of  separations.  These  in- 
clude day workers, whose jobs last only a single day. Thus a large frac- 
tion of the  17 percent are not losses  with the large and durable conse- 
quences of the loss of a long-term job. 
One of the cleanest  ways to measure rates of job loss is to ask a ran- 
dom sample of workers when they started their current jobs.  In stochas- 
tic equilibrium, inflows equal outflows,  so this measure of inflows must 
also measure outflows.  The second  line of table 1 shows  that the quar- 
terly separation rate is about 10 percent according to the tenure supple- 
ment to  the  Current Population  Survey  (CPS).'3 Because  the  survey 
asks about the beginning of employment,  presumably temporary separa- 
tions are generally excluded from this measure of turnover. Although I 
do not know of any detailed reconciliation,  I believe that very short jobs 
account for the difference between the 17 percent turnover rate from un- 
employment  insurance records and the 10 percent rate from the tenure 
survey.  To put it differently,  if the tenure  survey  had asked  whether 
workers had started their current jobs in the past week,  the number an- 
swering yes would be much greater than one-thirteenth of the quarterly 
rate. 
The CPS also provides another, rather different way to measure sepa- 
ration rates. 14 The survey determines the labor force status of workers 
in successive  months; if it changes from employment to something else, 
a separation has occurred.  Olivier Jean Blanchard and Peter Diamond 
adjusted the raw flows to take account of measurement errors. The ad- 
justed separation rate, shown on the third line of table 1, is about 8 per- 
cent per quarter, only a little below the rate from the tenure survey. Part 
of the difference arises from movements  from one job to another. In the 
opposite  direction,  the monthly frequency  of the CPS should pick up 
more of the short-job churning that makes the separation rate from un- 
employment insurance data so high. 
The fourth estimate in table 1 is the gross rate of employment  reduc- 
13.  Bureau of Labor Statistics (1983). 
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tions  in manufacturing. 15 This estimate  is constructed  from quarterly 
data on  employment  at individual plants  using  the  Longitudinal  Re- 
search Database (LRD). When the number of workers at a plant is less 
in one quarter than it was in an earlier quarter, there must have been at 
least  that many  separations  of  workers.  Although  temporary  layoffs 
could be part of the story,  Steven  Davis,  John Haltiwanger,  and Scott 
Schuh show that the majority of employment reductions are persistent. 
Most employment reductions across all plants in a given quarter, in fact, 
arise from large cutbacks in small numbers of plants. About  12 percent 
of all reductions are the result of shutdowns of entire plants, 56 percent 
of all reductions are at plants where total employment falls by at least 25 
percent,  and over 80 percent of all reductions are at plants where total 
employment falls by at least 10 percent.'6 
Gross employment reductions average almost 6 percent per quarter, 
which appears completely  consistent  with the total separation rates of 8 
or 10 percent  per quarter from the two  CPS sources.  The differences 
arise from separations that are replaced within the same quarter, leaving 
no net change in employment.17 Large cuts in plant-level  employment 
account  for around half the total separations  in the sense  measured in 
the CPS. 
The remaining measures of job loss in table 1 relate to displacement 
from jobs,  rather than total separations. The PSID interviews a panel of 
families once a year. 18 The quarterly frequency ofjob loss resulting from 
an employer going out of business,  a layoff or firing, or the completion 
of a job is a little under 2 percent.  Part of the difference from the other 
results arises from the elimination of quits, part from the annual nature 
of the interview  (which means that a worker with several job losses  in 
the past year is counted only once), and part from a tendency not to attri- 
bute a past job loss to displacement. 
Finally, the last two lines of table 1 report job-loss  rates from the Dis- 
placed Workers Survey, a supplement to the CPS. The most recent sur- 
vey was carried out in February 1994 and asked if respondents  had lost 
a job in the period  1991 through 1993 because  a plant or company  had 
15.  Davis,  Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1995). 
16.  Davis,  Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1995, figure 2.3). 
17. There is a small offsetting factor-workers  can be transferred between plants, gen- 
erating gross employment reductions without separations. 
18.  See Topel (1990). Robert  E.  Hall  235 
Table 2.  Job Loss with Subsequent Unemployment, Quarterly Rate 
Percent 
Reason for  separation  Frequency 
Permanent layoff  2.10 
Temporary layoff  1.44 
Quit  1.14 
Total  4.68 
Source:  Averages  of monthly data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics,  Current Population Survey  for the period 
June  1976 to April  1993, unemployment  by  duration and by  reason.  Unemployed  less  than five weeks,  stated  as a 
fraction of the civilian labor force  and multiplied by three. 
closed or moved, the worker's position or shift was abolished, there was 
insufficient work, or for "a similar reason." The rates are published for 
workers with three or more years of tenure, and for all workers.  When 
stated at quarterly rates, the incidence  of displacement  is much lower 
than for any other measure ofjob loss,  about 0.6 percent per quarter. As 
with the PSID, part of the difference arises from the exclusion  of multi- 
ple job losses  over the period, as well as the fact that respondents  often 
do not characterize a past separation as a displacement,  even though it 
would be classified as a layoff in contemporaneous  data. 
In the Displaced  Workers Survey,  low-tenure  workers have essen- 
tially  the  same  quarterly probability  of  displacement  as  high-tenure 
workers,  even  though  separation  rates  are much  higher for the  low- 
tenure workers.  This finding would  appear to  support the hypothesis 
that a separation is more likely to be considered a displacement in a ret- 
rospective  survey if it has larger personal consequences. 
Table 2 shows quarterly frequencies  of transitions from employment 
to unemployment  by reason.  The total  quarterly frequency  is a little 
under 5 percent, which appears to be consistent  with the other CPS data. 
Somewhat less than half of the flow into urnemployment  is from perma- 
nent layoffs.  Temporary layoffs are about a third of the flow, and quits 
are about a quarter. Permanent layoffs are a larger fraction of total un- 
employment  because  the departure rate from unemployment  is much 
higher for workers who are on temporary layoff or who quit their previ- 
ous jobs. 
To summarize the findings on the incidence  of job loss:  Gross turn- 
over in the labor market is high, because many jobs last only briefly. Put- 
ting aside the briefest jobs,  around 8 or 10 percent of workers separate 
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are voluntary quits and others are temporary layoffs.  Probably around 4 
percent of workers lose jobs permanently each quarter. Something like 
half of these permanent, involuntary losses  are sufficiently burdensome 
that a worker will identify the experience  retrospectively  as a displace- 
ment. And about 0.6 percent of workers suffer ajob loss each quarter so 
painful that it is remembered as a displacement  as much as three years 
later in the Displaced  Workers Survey.  As the next section  shows,  the 
consequences  of these job losses  are severe  in terms of unemployment 
and depressed earnings. 
Experience  after Job Loss 
There is a huge literature in labor economics  on the employment lev- 
els and earnings of workers who have lost jobs.  This section  will focus 
on studies of the postdisplacement  experiences  of workers surveyed in 
the Displaced  Workers Survey and the PSID. 
Even the simplest tabulation of the Displaced Workers Survey shows 
large differences between workers who were displaced during the three- 
year window  considered  by the survey  and workers in general.  As of 
February 1994, only 68 percent of the workers who had been displaced 
at some time during the window were employed;  19 percent were unem- 
ployed and 13 percent remained out of the labor force that month. 19  The 
appropriate comparison  group would be workers who did not get dis- 
placed  but whose  personal  characteristics  and earlier work  histories 
were  similar to those  of the displaced  workers.  Unfortunately,  no re- 
searcher has made this kind of a comparison tabulation, but it is obvious 
that much lower employment would be found among displaced workers 
than among the comparison group for an extended period after displace- 
ment. Henry Farber has tabulated data that help to make this point, al- 
though without the use of the appropriate comparison group. For 1988, 
Farber finds unemployment  rates of 31 percent  among men who  had 
been displaced within two years of the survey, in comparison to 4.3 per- 
cent among men who had not been displaced.  The numbers are similar 
for women: 27 percent and 4.5 percent, respectively.20 
By far the most useful study of postdisplacement  experience  for the 
19.  Bureau of Labor Statistics (1994, table 4). 
20.  Farber (1993, table 3). Robert E. Hall  237 
Figure  3.  Increase  in Unemployment  Due to Prior  Job Displacement 
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Source:  Author's  calculations  from Ruhm (1991. table  1, column a), using data from the PSID. 
purposes of this paper is that conducted by Christopher  Ruhm, using 
data  from  the PSID.2'  Ruhm  estimates  equations  for annual  weeks of un- 
employment  and weekly earnings  for all workers in the PSID. He in- 
cludes dummy  variables  for a displacement  in the year  of the survey  and 
in each of the four preceding years. He interprets  the coefficients as 
measures  of the difference  between the experience  of workers  with and 
without earlier displacement. He investigates the possibility that dis- 
placement  is correlated  with determinants  of unemployment  and hours 
that  are not included  in his regressions.  The evidence suggests  that  these 
effects are small. 
Figure  3 shows Ruhm's  findings  for unemployment.  In the year  of dis- 
placement a worker has, on the average, about 17 extra percentage 
points of unemployment.  In the year after displacement  extra unem- 
ployment is about 9 percentage  points, and there is still an important 
amount of extra unemployment  two, three, and four years after dis- 
placement.  Figure  4 shows the corresponding  estimates  for weekly earn- 
ings. For weeks actually worked in the year of displacement,  earnings 
21. Ruhm  (1991). 238  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
Figure  4. Loss in Earnings  Due to Job Displacement 
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Source:  Author's  calculations  from  Ruhm  (1991.  table 1, column  a), using  data  from  the PSID. 
are  about  90 percent  of those of comparable  nondisplaced  workers  in the 
same year. In the year after displacement  the ratio falls below 85 per- 
cent. Even after four years, earnings  are still almost 15 percent below 
the level of comparable  nondisplaced  workers. 
Ruhm's  findings  can be summarized  in terms  of the capitalized  value 
of the lost earnings,  considering  both increased  unemployment  and de- 
creased  weekly earnings.  I fitted  a linear  trend  to the log of the combined 
effect following  a displacement  and  found  that  it crossed zero after  eight 
years. At a discount rate of 3 percent per year, the present discounted 
value of the nine-year  stream  of reduced  earnings  is about 1.2 years of 
earnings.  Thus the financial  consequence of ajob loss counted as a dis- 
placement  is about 120  percent  of a worker's  annual  earnings.  This fig- 
ure is sensitive to the definition  of a displacement. The consequence 
would  be smaller,  for example, under  the CPS definition  of a separation 
as illustrated  in table 1, and larger  under  the Displaced  Workers  Survey 
definition  of a displacement. Robert E. Hall  239 
Aggregate Implications 
The findings for experiences  of individual workers fit into the broader 
picture  of  the  behavior  of  the  aggregate  economy  in rather different 
ways, depending on other features of the aggregate economy.  One polar 
view is that labor demand is highly wage-elastic,  so the level of employ- 
ment accommodates  shifts of the labor supply schedule.  The top panel 
of figure 5 illustrates this view.  The labor supply schedule  on the right 
applies  in normal times  and shows  the volume  of work net of normal 
amounts of job  search.  The supply schedule  on the left applies after a 
one-time shock has perturbed the labor market. As a result of a burst of 
primary job loss,  workers find it necessary  to spend more time looking 
for work and less time working. Because labor demand is elastic, the dy- 
namics of employment are controlled largely by the labor supply choice 
between working and looking for work. 
The bottom panel of figure 5 shows  the opposite  polar case.  Labor 
demand is inelastic and labor supply is highly elastic.  Some economists 
rationalize elastic supply as the consequence  of wage rigidity; others be- 
lieve that the elasticity  of substitution of work with future work or with 
nonwork activities  is high. The shock that caused  the burst of primary 
job loss persists as a leftward shift of labor demand. Elastic labor supply 
accommodates  the decline in demand. Employment dynamics are con- 
trolled by labor demand. Findings about unemployment in the aftermath 
of the adverse shock tell us how the economy  allocates  scarce jobs. 
The rest of this paper will explore the first case.  I interpret the data as 
showing that a burst of primary job loss causes  an extended  increase in 
job search in place of employment.  Although a transitory decline in de- 
mand is presumably part of the source of the burst of primary  job loss,  I 
hypothesize  that there is no continuing shortfall of demand. The persis- 
tence of movements of employment can be completely  accounted for by 
the dynamics of rebuilding employment relationships after the shock. 
The main reason for my position that persistent shifts of labor do not 
play an important role in the business cycle is a standard one: in a simple 
model, labor demand is just the marginal product of labor. The only pos- 
sible source of a persistent adverse shift in labor demand is a persistent 
decline in productivity. I remain skeptical that technical regress is an im- 
portant part of the story of lingering slumps in the economy. 240  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1995 
Figure 5.  Alternative Views of the Labor Market 
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The economy  may not be so simple. For example, if sellers have mar- 
ket power, and this increases  after an adverse shock, the labor demand 
schedule would shift to the left for as long as the increase persists.  And 
product markets may operate  in more complicated  ways  than simple 
supply-and-demand or simple monopoly.  In particular, product price ri- 
gidity may lead to a labor market analysis similar to the bottom panel of 
figure 5. Further, the truth may lie somewhere  between  the two polar 
cases  shown in figure 5. One interesting possibility is that both labor de- 
mand and labor supply are highly elastic.  In that case, equilibrium in the 
labor market may be close  to indeterminate-persistent  movements  in 
unemployment  may be explained by many factors beyond labor supply 
dynamics.22 
The experiences  of individuals in the labor market are governed  by 
probabilities.  The findings on the incidence  of job  loss  in table  1 are 
stated explicitly  as quarterly probabilities,  and the findings about post- 
displacement  unemployment  and earnings losses  discussed  above  are 
implicitly statements about probabilities distilled from the widely vary- 
ing experiences  of individuals. Aggregate conditions affect the probabil- 
ities  facing  individuals.  The magnitudes  of these  effects  are different 
under alternative views  on general-equilibrium macroeconomic  issues. 
In particular, in some versions of the view shown in the bottom panel of 
figure 5,job-finding probabilities would be higher when demand is strong 
than when it is weak.  If the higher unemployment  during slumps is pri- 
marily congestion  resulting from many workers pursuing few jobs,  then 
job-finding rates must fall during periods  of high unemployment.  The 
evidence  on the cyclical  behavior of the job-finding rate is mixed; there 
is some indication of congestion  effects,  but the rate is surprisingly sta- 
ble.23 Davis,  Haltiwanger,  and Schuh  show  that the job-creation  rate 
reaches a strong maximum in the early part of a recovery.24 Some other 
probabilities, such as the quit rate or the rate of departure from the labor 
force, clearly vary over the cycle. 
Both the empirical results and the probability model discussed  in the 
following sections are based on the hypothesis  that the transition proba- 
bilities are roughly constant  over the cycle.  The only exception  is the 
probability of primary job loss,  which is taken as data and shows  occa- 
22.  See Hall (1991). 
23.  See Hall (1991). 
24.  Davis,  Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1995). 242  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
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a. Total  reduction in employment  at plants where  employment  fell from one  quarter to the next,  as a percent  of 
total employment. 
sional bursts to levels far above normal. The analysis should be seen as 
an attempt to find out how far labor market dynamics can be explained 
with only a single souce of cyclical variation, the rate of primary  job loss. 
Evidence  on Labor  Market  Dynamics 
Figure 6 shows  quarterly data on gross  employment  reductions  in 
manufacturing,  taken  from  the  work  of  Davis,  Haltiwanger,  and 
Schuh.25 As noted earlier, these reductions are measured at the level of 
individual plants. The series shows the total reduction in employment at 
plants where employment fell from one quarter to the next, as a percent 
of total employment.  Gross  employment  reductions  appear to be the 
best  available  measure of the immediate  effect  of adverse  macroeco- 
nomic events on the labor market. In particular, as figure 6 shows, reces- 
25.  Davis,  Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1995). The data will be available shortly from the 
Bureau of the Census Internet FTP. The original data are not seasonally  adjusted; I have 
subtracted seasonal means. Robert E. Hall  243 
Figure 7.  New Permanent Layoff Unemployment, Quarterly,  1976-93a 
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quarter of year shown. 
a. Percentage  of the labor force unemployed  (less  than five weeks)  due to permanent layoffs. 
sions  start off with large bursts of employment  reductions.  The flow of 
gross  employment  reductions  is  not  persistent;  during the  extended 
slump after a sharp contraction,  gross  employment  reductions  are at 
normal levels.26 Persistence  in unemployment and employment appears 
to come from other sources. 
Data on  the flow of workers  into unemployment  provide  another, 
quite different view of the dynamics  of job loss.  The best data for this 
purpose show  the flow from permanent layoffs  alone,  as distinct from 
temporary layoffs,  quits, new entrants, and reentrants. Figure 7 shows 
these data since they first became available,  in 1976.27  New  permanent 
layoffs are much more persistent  than gross job reductions.  A burst of 
job reductions,  as in 1982, is followed  by several years of higher levels 
26.  As Davis,  Haltiwanger, and Schuh note, plant-level employment  is highly persis- 
tent; it is essentially  a random walk. Hence the flow of reductions is close to white noise. 
27.  The data come from the Current Population Survey and are published in Bureau of 
Labor Statistics,  Employment and Earnings.  They refer to workers who became  unem- 
ployed as a result of permanent layoff,  whose  unemployment  began within five weeks  of 
the survey. 244  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
Figure 8.  Distributed Lag Coefficients for New Permanent Layoff Unemployment on 
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Source:  Regression  coefficients  from second  column of table 3. 
of new permanent  layoffs. The data have a strong  distributed  lag rela- 
tionship,  as is shown in figure  8.28 
A number  of factors combine  to explain  the lag from  employment  re- 
ductions  to new unemployment.  First, employment  reductions  are mea- 
sured  only in manufacturing,  whereas new unemployment  is measured 
economywide.29  A systematic  lag  of nonmanufacturing  behind  manufac- 
turing  would explain some part of the lag shown in figure  8. Second, 
many workers who lose their  jobs do not become unemployed-they 
move immediately  to other  jobs or leave the labor  force. During  the pe- 
riod  of slack labor  markets  following  a burst  of employment  reductions, 
28. This  and  other  distributed  lags  embody  the hypothesis,  noted  earlier,  that  the tran- 
sition  probabilities  do not vary  over the cycle. If there  is some variation,  the estimated  lags 
should  approximate  the average  relation  over the cycle. In addition,  the use of regression 
depends  on the assumption  that  the disturbances  in the lag relation  are uncorrelated  with 
gross employment  reductions.  That is, a burst  of primary  job loss does not shift the lag 
relation;  and, a random  jump  in unemployment  does not cause primary  job losses. 
29. In principle,  data  on new permanent-layoff  unemployment  among  workers  previ- 
ously employed  in manufacturing  could be tabulated  from  the CPS, but it would  require 
processing  all of the monthly  tapes. I do not believe that  this has yet been done. Robert  E.  Hall  245 
Table 3.  Distributed Lag Regressions of New Unemployment by Reason on Gross 
Employment Reduction, 1978-88a 
Lags  on  Dependent  variable 
gross 
employment  Permanent  Temnporary  Left  New 
reductions  layoff  layoff  job  Reentrant  entrant  Total 
0  0.0943  0.1258  -0.0025  0.0511  0.0233  0.2921 
1  0.0649  0.0323  -  0.0275  -  0.0078  0.0024  0.0643 
2  0.0259  0.0202  -  0.0207  0.0137  0.0227  0.0618 
3  0.0412  0.0621  -  0.0186  0.0193  0.0113  0.1152 
4  0.0110  -0.0460  -  0.0061  -  0.0023  -  0.0008  -  0.0443 
5  0.0420  -0.0026  -0.0131  0.0123  0.0106  0.0492 
6  0.0281  0.0359  -  0.0016  0.0081  0.0120  0.0826 
7  0.0643  0.0208  -0.0125  -0.0020  0.0181  0.0888 
Sum  0.3718  0.2484  -0.1025  0.0925  0.0997  0.7097 
(0.0543)  (0.0970)  (0.0400)  (0.0623)  (0.0997) 
Summarv statistics 
Mean  2.99  1.70  3.04  1.78  3.32  2.42 
R  2  0.897  0.925  0.826  0.863  0.950 
SER  0.136  0.142  0.092  0.109  0.078 
rho  0.560  0.809  0.636  0.802  0.487 
Sources:  Author's  regressions  based  on  the  Bureau of  Labor  Statistics,  Current Population  Survey  and Davis, 
Haltiwanger,  and Schuh (1995). 
a.  Dependent  variables  are workers  unemployed  less  than five  weeks,  as  a fraction  of  the  civilian  labor force. 
Independent variables are current and seven quarterly lagged values of gross employment  reductions in manufacturing 
as a fraction of the civilian  labor force,  plus seasonal  dummies.  Estimation  includes  correction  for first-order serial 
correlation  of  disturbances.  The  regressions  cover  1978,  first  quarter,  through  1988,  fourth  quarter  (forty-four 
observations).  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
a larger fraction of job-losers  become  unemployed.  Third, permanent 
job loss has important delayed effects.  Many of the workers who move 
quickly to otherjobs  have taken temporary work, jobs with either prede- 
termined short terms or naturally high turnover. Also, those who left the 
labor force  upon loss  of a long-term job  often reenter the labor force 
later. 
Table 3 gives a fuller picture of the lagged effects of bursts of employ- 
ment reductions in the labor market. It shows distributed lag regressions 
of the five types of new unemployment  on current and seven  quarterly 
lagged  values  of  gross  employment  reductions.  The  second  column 
shows the long stream of induced permanent layoffs over the two-year 
period (despite  the  large  size  of  the  7-quarter lag coefficient,  longer 
lagged effects were found to be small). The third column shows that tem- 
porary layoffs are an important means of achieving immediate employ- 246  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
ment reductions,  and that there are some downstream  induced tempo- 
rary layoffs. But a much larger fraction of the total amount of temporary 
layoffs induced by a given gross reduction in employment  occurs  con- 
temporaneously  than for permanent layoffs  (0.1258/0.2484  for tempo- 
rary layoffs and 0.0943/0.3718 for permanent layoffs). 
The fourth column of table 3 shows the reductions in the flow of job- 
quitters  into  unemployment  following  a burst of  employment  reduc- 
tions.  Slacker  conditions  in the labor market reduce  the frequency  of 
quits. Although this finding is consistent  with the suppressed renegotia- 
tion model of the employment relationship,  it is also consistent  with ef- 
ficient employment  relationships.  Note  that the negative effect  of em- 
ployment  reductions  on  quits  is  spread  over  the  eight  quarters-it 
appears to be a response to the persistent slack conditions in the market, 
not to the burst of employment reductions that start the process. 
The fifth column of table 3 shows the pattern of reentrant unemploy- 
ment in the labor force induced by a burst of gross employment  reduc- 
tions, and the sixth column does the same for new entrants. In principle, 
the process  set in motion by employment reductions could induce reen- 
trance.  Workers who lose jobs  often spend some time out of the labor 
force.  However,  the reentrant coefficients  and the new entrant coeffi- 
cients are similar, given sampling variation, so most of the effect shown 
probably  comes  from  weaker  conditions  in the  labor market,  which 
make unemployment  more likely for a given flow of reentrants and new 
entrants. 
Table 3 shows the pattern of the onset of spells of unemployment after 
a burst of primary  job losses.  In each category, job-seekers  take time to 
find new work or leave  the labor force.  Figure 9 shows  the lag coeffi- 
cients on gross employment reductions for total unemployment in all du- 
ration categories.  Because  this lag includes  both the lag from primary 
job loss to induced job loss and the subsequent search time, it is appreci- 
ably longer than in figure 8 or table 3. 
A Model of Labor Market Dynamics 
This section  describes  a probability model of the processes  that are 
set in motion by a burst of primary job  losses.  Although the model  is 
loosely  calibrated to various sources  of labor market data, its purpose Robert E. Hall  247 
Figure  9. Distributed  Lag Coefficients  for Total  Unemployment  on Gross  Employment 
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Source:  Davis,  Haltiwanger,  and Schuh (1995). 
a. Bars show regression coefficients  with total unemployment  as a percent of the labor force as dependent  variable, 
and current and eleven  quarterly lagged  values  of  gross  employment  reductions  in manufacturing as  independent 
variables.  Sum  of  lag  coefficients:  1.45;  standard  error  of  the  regression:  0.25;  R2:  0.975;  serial  correlation  of 
disturbances:  0.88.  The standard errors of the lag coefficients  are all very close  to 0.03. 
here is illustrative-its relation  to the U.S. labor  market  is similar  to the 
relation  of a real business cycle model  to the U.S. economy. 
Both the microeconomic  and the macroeconomic  evidence strongly 
suggests that terminations  beget later terminations. When an event 
breaks a set of long-term  employment relationships, the workers re- 
leased into the labor  market  will form  new relationships,  many  of which 
will prove to be short-lived.  First, it may make  sense for an individual  to 
take a temporary  job while looking  for a new permanent  job. Second, a 
worker  long out of the market  may experiment  with alternative  types of 
work  before  finding  a good long-term  match.  Third,  employers  may  have 
explicit policies of hiring  many  candidates  and  keeping  only the fraction 
who prove to be well matched. Fourth, immediately  after being hired, 
the typical  worker  will be close to the margin  for discharge,  either  by the 
standards  of the efficient  separation  model  or of the model  of suppressed 248  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
renegotiation.  Neither  the  systematic  accumulation  of match-specific 
capital nor the random accumulation of rent will have had much time to 
occur.  Low-tenure  workers are the logical candidates for separation- 
last hired, first fired is the rational separation rule under broad condi- 
tions. 
Induced subsequent job losses  seem to be a promising explanation of 
persistence.  Following  a single adverse  shock,  employment  will be de- 
pressed  and unemployment  elevated  by subsequent  rounds of adjust- 
ment in the labor market. The model presented in this section illustrates 
how persistent  unemployment  and employment  result from lagged re- 
sponses to earlier shocks. 
A glance at the data shows that a simple model of transitions between 
jobs and search cannot be faithful to even the most conspicuous  features 
of the market's dynamics.  Rates of separation from jobs decline sharply 
with tenure on the job, and job-finding rates fall with the duration of un- 
employment.  Part of the duration dependence  is genuine,  and part re- 
flects the sorting of heterogeneous  workers.30 Moreover,  previous  his- 
tory appears to influence transition rates. For example,  it appears that 
workers  terminated from long-term jobs  have  lower job-finding rates 
than other searchers, are more likely to lose subsequent jobs than other 
short-tenure workers,  and have even  lower job-finding rates in subse- 
quent spells of unemployment.3" 
To characterize  the way  that job  losers  eventually  make their way 
back into long-term jobs,  I have set up a more elaborate model.  Figure 
10 shows the major concepts  and flows. Low-tenure regularjobs are fur- 
ther broken into four tenure categories: less than six months, six months 
to one year, one to two years, and two to three years. High-tenure regu- 
lar jobs are broken into eight tenure categories: the category of three to 
five years,  six categories  of five-year width,  and the category  of more 
than thirty-five years.  Regular job  search and displacement  search are 
broken into three categories: less than one quarter, one to two quarters, 
and more than two quarters. Interim jobs  are not broken down by du- 
ration. 
Displacement  is defined in the model as the loss  of a job with three 
30.  See Heckman and Singer (1985) and Devine and Kiefer (1991). 
31.  See Farber (1993). Farber was not able to measure each of these effects separately, 
but the magnitude of the subsequent employment  reductions suggests  that all of them are 
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Figure 10.  States and Transitions in Turnover Model 
High-tenure 
r-egulai-job  l  regular  job 
Low-tenure  Regular search 
*  regularjob 
Displacement  Interim  job  search 
years or more of tenure. A displaced worker may move immediately to a 
regularjob or to an interim job, or may enter displacement  search. From 
there, the worker may find an interim job or a regular job.  Workers in 
regularjobs either advance in tenure, eventually crossing to high-tenure 
jobs,  or they lose ajob  and start over at zero tenure, or go through a pe- 
riod of regular search. The apparatus of displacement search and interim 
jobs is not intended to suggest a fundamental distinction,  but simply to 
capture the adverse experiences  of some workers who lose high-tenure 
jobs. 
To measure departure rates from jobs,  I rely on data on job tenure.32 
The cross-sectional  distribution of workers by tenure reveals total sepa- 
rations by tenure as  1 minus the ratio of the number of workers in one 
tenure category to the number in the earlier category.33 Figure 11 shows 
32.  Bureau of Labor Statistics (1983). 
33.  A spreadsheet is available from the author providing the details of the calculation, 
including adjustments for the width of the tenure categories and the sizes of the cohorts. 250  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
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Source:  Author's  calculadons  from  Bureau  of Labor  Statistics  (1983). 
quarterly  separation  rates by tenure. More than 25 percent of workers 
who have been on the job for less than half a year separate  from their 
jobs each calendar  quarter.  The rate  drops  to 5 to 10  percent  per quarter 
through  tenure  of fifteen  years, and  then  drops  to 2 to 3 percent  per quar- 
ter for the most senior  workers.  The data  include  both quits  and layoffs, 
without  making  any distinction  between them. 
The measurement  of job-finding  rates is much more of a challenge. 
Although  data  on unemployment  by duration  could be processed in ex- 
actly the same way as data  on employment  by tenure, the results  would 
reveal departure  rates for unemployment,  not job-finding  rates. First, 
data on unemployment  cannot say anything  about  job losers who find 
new work without becoming unemployed. Second, many  job-seekers 
spend periods out of the labor  force when they are not actively looking 
for work, and so are not counted as unemployed.  Kim Clark  and Law- 
rence Summers  have established  that  job seekers often have long spells 
between  jobs, despite the low incidence of long-term  unemployment.34 
Table  4 shows the transition  probabilities  other  than  those for separa- 
34. See Clark  and  Summers  (1979). Robert  E. Hall  251 
Table 4.  Job Search Transition Probabilities 
From regular  From displacement 
job  search  job  search 
Find  Find  Find 
Years  regular job  interim job  regular job 
0-1  0.70  0.70  0.10 
1-2  0.50  0.50  0.05 
2<  0.30  0.40  0.02 
Probability of unemployment  while in interim job  0.50 
Probability of unemployment  after loss  of low-tenure  regular job  0.05 
Probability of unemployment  after loss  of high-tenure regular job  0.04 
Probability of interim job  after loss  of high-tenure regular job  0.08 
Source:  Author's  calculations  described  in text. 
tion and advancement.  I chose the overall level of these probabilities to 
generate a realistic equilibrium unemployment rate; the levels of the in- 
dividual probabilities are informed guesswork.  The top panel shows the 
quarterly  job-finding rates for the two kinds of search; these decline with 
the duration of search. The first three lines of the bottom panel show the 
probabilities of becoming  unemployed  while holding an interim job  or 
just after losing a regular  job. Given the quarterly time period used in the 
model, these probabilities are much lower than the probability of a small 
amount ofjob search, such as a week. The last line shows the probability 
of going directly to an interim job after losing a high-tenure regular  job. 
The model is a nineteen-state  Markoff process.  Its stochastic  equilib- 
rium can be calculated directly from the transition probabilities.35 The 
equilibrium distribution across tenure categories mirrors the CPS tenure 
data. The equilibrium unemployment  rate is 4.3 percent,  of which  3.5 
percent is displacement unemployment.  The unemployment rate is well 
below the average U.S.  unemployment  rate of about 6 percent because 
the model does not deal with unemployment  associated  with very brief 
jobs and with new entrants. 
To characterize a burst of primary  job losses,  I created a special ver- 
sion of the model's  transition matrix in which the separation rate in all 
tenure categories  was raised by 10 percentage points. This shock simu- 
lates the shutdown of  10 percent of the economy.  It shifts the balance 
of job-seekers  toward those  in displacement  search,  and increases  the 
fraction of workers in interim jobs.  I apply this transition matrix once to 
35.  The model is available from the author in the form of an Excel spreadsheet. 252  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
Figure 12.  Employment Response to Shock 
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Source:  Author's  calculations  based  on model  described  in text. 
the equilibrium  distribution.  The result shows the predicted  state of the 
labor market  immediately  after the shock; there are far more than the 
usual  number  of displaced  job-seekers. Then  I apply  the standard  transi- 
tion matrix  for twenty quarters,  giving  the market  enough  time to return 
to its original  equilibrium. 
Figure 12 shows the level of employment  before and after the one- 
time shock.36  The majority  of workers, including  the high-tenure  dis- 
placed workers, find new work within the quarter  of the shock. In the 
second quarter  after the shock, employment  closes almost one-fifth  of 
the distance back to equilibrium.  Many  of the extra  job-seekers caused 
by the shock are still in the productive  early  phase ofjob search. In sub- 
sequent quarters,  the return  to equilibrium  slows down because the re- 
maining  extra  job-seekers are the ones who are hard  to match. 
In the model, workers  are either  working  or looking  for work. Hence 
36. The actual  shock causes 10  percent  of workers  to lose their  jobs instantly,  but  the 
reduction  in employment  is much  smaller  by the next quarter.  In the quarterly  model, a 
large  fraction  ofjob losers  do not become  unemployed  (see table  4). It is a topic  for  further 
research  to determine  if a constant-transition-probability  model  can imitate  the observed 
relation  between primary  job loss and subsequent  unemployment.  The quarterly  model 
clearly  does not, but  much  of the failure  may  be the result  of too coarse  a time  unit. Robert E. Hall  253 
Figure 13. Flow  of New Job Seekers 
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Source:  Author's  calculatsons  based  on model  described  in text. 
the time path of unemployment  is just the inverse of the employment 
time path of figure 12. There is reasonable agreement between the 
model's dynamics in figure 12 and the corresponding  finding  for U.S. 
data  in figure  9. Bursts  of primary  job loss appear  to cause reduced  utili- 
zation of labor services for two years and more while the displaced 
workers  make  their  way back into durable  job matches. 
The model  also captures  the induced  lagged  flow into unemployment. 
Figure  8 showed how important  these induced  lagged  effects are in the 
U.S. labor market;  figure 13 is its counterpart  for the model. A single 
burst of primary  job loss results in many spells of unemployment  that 
start  as late as two years after  the burst.  The speed with which one job- 
seeker finds ajob greatly  overstates the speed of recovery of the labor 
market  to normal  conditions. 
The Aggregate Significance  of Lost Jobs 
Figure 14  presents  a time-series  estimate  of the value associated with 
permanent,  serious  job losses in the U.S. economy. The pattern  over 
time is derived from Davis, Haltiwanger,  and Schuh's series for gross 254  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
Figure 14.  Value Associated with Job Losses in the U.S.  Economy, Quarterly,  1972-93 
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employment reductions.37  Their quarterly series ends in 1988; I extrapo- 
lated later values  by fitting a regression  to their data with current and 
four  lagged  values  of  manufacturing  employment,  and  current  and 
lagged values of new claims for unemployment insurance, together with 
seasonal dummies, as right-hand variables. I estimated the frequency of 
serious,  permanent job loss  corresponding  to the PSID concept  of job 
displacement  by multiplying gross employment  reductions by the ratio 
of PSID permanent layoffs per quarter to the average value of gross em- 
ployment reductions (the ratio is 1.81/5.66).  I next multiplied by  1.2 to 
state the effect  of a displacement  in the PSID  in terms of the present 
value  of  eventual  lost  earnings,  based  on  my  earlier  discussion  of 
Ruhm's findings. Finally,  I multiplied by total compensation  stated in 
1987 dollars, using the GDP deflator. Figure 15 shows the value as a frac- 
tion of total compensation. 
The value associated  with job loss  should not be considered  a mea- 
sure of the cost ofjob loss.  Within the theory ofjob  loss outlined earlier, 
the estimate in figures 14 and 15 is an upper bound on the personal and 
37.  Davis,  Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1995). Robert E. Hall  255 
Figure 15.  Value Associated with Job Losses in the U.S.  Economy as a Percentage of 
Total Compensation, Quarterly,  1972-93 
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social  cost  of  the  suppression  of  renegotiation.  In the  extreme  case 
where  every  worker who  loses  a job  would  have  been  retained if the 
wage were $0.01 less  per hour, the estimates  measure the actual cost. 
Even in that case, however,  the benefits of the suppression of renegotia- 
tion need to be reckoned against this measure of cost.  Theory suggests 
that suppression  of renegotiation  has an important role in stimulating 
beneficial investment in job-specific  skills. 
With all these  warnings in mind, figures 14 and 15 tell an interesting 
story. First, recessions  are times of huge spikes in job-loss  value. From 
levels around $25 billion per year in 1972 and 1973,job-loss  value peaked 
at over $70 billion per year in the sharp contraction in late 1974. The cy- 
clical peaks  in 1980 and 1982 reached almost  exactly  the same levels. 
From  1984 there  has  been  an upward trend in job-loss  value  that is 
greater than the underlying trend in real compensation.  Although the cy- 
clical peak in early 1991 was not nearly as pronounced as earlier peaks, 
it reached a slightly higher level  ($76 billion in 1987 dollars) because  it 
started from a much higher base level.  And the recovery  since that peak 
has seen a flow ofjob-loss  value of over $60 billion per year. 256  Brookings Papers  on Economic Activity, 1.1995 
Concluding  Remarks 
Some basic properties of job loss have emerged in this review of the 
evidence.  Microeconomic  studies  of  serious job  loss  show  significant 
downstream effects on the subsequent experiences  of individuals in the 
labor market. Loss  of a long-term job leads to periods of episodic  em- 
ployment,  periods  of job  search or time out of the labor market, and 
lower earnings when working. The effects extend for at least four years. 
In the macroeconomic  evidence,  bursts of gross employment reductions 
coincide  with abnormal levels  of serious job loss.  The downstream  ef- 
fects  visible in time-series  data for unemployment  are similar to the ef- 
fects found in microeconomic  data for individuals. 
The macroeconomic  data show occasional  sharp disruptions of em- 
ployment followed  by long periods of rebuilding employment  relation- 
ships. The length of time that the economy  takes to recover from an ad- 
verse  shock  has  perplexed  macroeconomists  for  many  years.  This 
rebuilding may be an important part of the propagation mechanism  of 
the business cycle. 
A related puzzle is why shocks cause such large bursts of primary  job 
loss.  One reason may be that employment  relationships  are fragile be- 
cause  their terms cannot be renegotiated,  as discussed  early in the pa- 
per. The story of fragility, however,  must go far beyond the suppression 
of renegotiation.  Much more needs  to be done to explain bursts of job 
losses  during the sharp contraction phase of recessions. Comments 
and Discussion 
Henry  Farber:  Turnabout being fair play,  I am privileged  to discuss 
Bob Hall's paper here today. After all, he discussed  my paper onjob loss 
at a microeconomics  meeting of the Brookings Panel a few years ago. ' 
Hall's new paper shows his strength as a master of synthesis.  The paper 
uses what historians and biographers call secondary sources.  Little new 
empirical analysis is presented.  Rather, existing studies become  part of 
an overarching  analytical framework to make a strong and important 
point. 
The goal of Hall's analysis is to argue that sharp episodes  of job loss 
at the outset of a recession  result in echoes  of further job loss long after 
the initial shock  has occurred.  He argues that these  ripples occur be- 
cause  workers  displaced  from stable long-term jobs  do not settle  into 
new long-term jobs immediately.  They suffer periods of employment  in 
interimjobs that are short-lived, some because they are meant to be tem- 
porary while the displaced workers search for a new long-term job,  and 
some because  match quality may be an experience  good,  in the sense 
that workers have to try ajob out to determine whether it is a good match 
or not. Bad matches end while good matches persist. 
The Theory of Terminations 
The paper has several distinct sections.  In the first section,  Hall pre- 
sents a lucid discussion  of what he calls a theory of terminations.  This 
discussion  makes clear the conditions  under which separations will be 
efficient.  In particular, it is  required that wages  be  able to  adjust to 
changing market conditions  (alternative wages of workers and value of 
1.  Farber (1993). 
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marginal product of workers).  Where wages  are unable to adjust, per- 
haps  because  of  incomplete  information  (employers  cannot  verify 
claims of high alternative wages,  workers cannot verify claims of low 
marginal productivity),  there is what he terms suppression of renegotia- 
tion. In this case there will be excess  turnover, a point he has made with 
Edward Lazear.2 Indeed the norms of operation of most U.S.  labor mar- 
kets  suggest  strongly that renegotiation  is suppressed;  that individual 
wages do not adjust to changing market conditions.  The goal of this sec- 
tion is to argue that wages do not adjust and hence, that there are excess 
separations. 
Hall makes two other points worth noting. The first is a useful distinc- 
tion between  suppression of renegotiation and the general idea of wiage 
rigidity. While suppression of renegotiation is part of what macroecono- 
mists mean when they talk about wage rigidity, they are also referring to 
the idea that entry-level wages are rigid: the idea that, in a recession,  you 
generally cannot go to the factory gate, offer to work for less money than 
existing workers,  and be hired. The second point is that suppression of 
renegotiation  may be  efficient  to the  extent  that it allows  for certain 
kinds of specific investments  in workers that might not otherwise  take 
place. The idea that suppression of renegotiation is a market failure may 
not be correct. 
Synthesis  of Existing Empirical Evidence 
The second  section  of the paper is more problematic.  Here Hall at- 
tempts a synthesis  of existing empirical work on job loss and its conse- 
quences  to make his case that the sharp loss of jobs  at the beginning of 
recessions  has longer-term consequences  for unemployment. 
THE  RATE  OF  JOB  LOSS.  There is a discussion  of alternative  mea- 
sures of quarterly job loss rates presented in table 1. The rate of perma- 
nent separations given by the unemployment insurance system includes 
quits. This measure is very high, but a substantial fraction of separations 
are not job loss at all. The rate of job loss from the CPS reports of short 
tenure on the current job likewise includes quits and new entrants, bias- 
ing the estimate of the rate of job loss upward. But it also requires that 
workers be reemployed  after a job change,  biasing the estimate  of the 
rate ofjob  loss downward. Gross employment reductions from the LRD 
2.  Hall and Lazear (1984). Robert E. Hall  259 
cover manufacturing only, and miss job loss that is offset by gains in em- 
ployment  at the establishment  level.  The data from the PSID and the 
Displaced  Workers Surveys  (DWS) seem to me to provide better mea- 
sures of the rate of job loss because they contain retrospective  informa- 
tion on individuals by cause of job change.  Of course,  these have some 
problems as well.  For example,  the DWS is likely to be biased down- 
ward because  it records no more than one job loss per worker in a five- 
year interval (three years in the most recent DWS). 
Hall has attempted to turn the variety of these measures into a virtue 
by highlighting their differences.  He proceeds  to use their different esti- 
mates to decompose  the overall separation rate (including quits) into its 
component parts. Voluntary separations and temporary layoffs are a lit- 
tle over one-quarter of total separations.  Where does  this figure come 
from? Hall must be subtracting the LRD-based  gross  employment  re- 
duction rate from one or both of the CPS-based separation rates. This is 
not likely to be very reliable, for the reasons discussed  above.  Coverage 
is different. And it is well known from surveys,  like the PSID, that con- 
tain consistent information on separation by cause, that the ratio of quits 
to total separations is procyclical.  He then uses the approximately 2 per- 
cent rate of permanent layoffs found in the PSID in 1985, together with 
data from the DWS in 1991-93, to conclude  that only about 0.6 percent 
of permanent job loss is "so painful that it is remembered as a displace- 
ment as much as three years later." The fact that these numbers are from 
different time periods and different points in the cycle  surely affects the 
calculations. 
This may be the most extreme  example of comparing apples and or- 
anges that I have seen in a while.  Hall recognizes  the different concep- 
tual bases  and time periods of his measures,  but he somehow  believes 
that the arithmetic involved in making these breakdowns is reliable. I am 
not convinced.  And the issue  of reliability is important because  Hall 
uses these estimates later, when he calibrates his model of labor market 
dynamics. 
EXPERIENCE  OF  WORKERS  AFTER  JOB  LOSS.  The next part ofthe  pa- 
per is on the experience of workers afterjob loss. Here Hall relies almost 
exclusively  on Ruhm's study of the consequences  ofjob  loss using data 
from the PSID for  1971-75.3 Ruhm estimates  the effect  of job  loss  on 
wage levels and the probability of unemployment for four years after the 
3.  Ruhm (1991). 260  Brookings Papers on Econiomic Activity, 1:1995 
loss.  His results are quite clear in demonstrating that the consequences 
ofjob loss for unemployment probabilities fall off steadily with time, but 
that the higher unemployment is still significant four years later. Ruhm's 
results also clearly show that the loss in weekly wages is more persistent 
than is the higher unemployment.  Hall takes these estimates and creates 
an extreme out-of-sample forecast to compute that eight years after the 
job  loss  the combined  employment  and wage  effects  of job  loss  go to 
zero. I wonder how reliable this forecast is. 
On rereading Ruhm's paper, I cannot see how his results can be inter- 
preted as being directly relevant to the effects  of the loss  of long-term 
jobs.  It is true that the analysis controls for tenure, but since the job loss 
rate from long-term jobs is very low, surely the estimates are largely de- 
termined by the loss of short-term jobs. 
EVIDENCE  ON  LABOR  MARKET  DYNAMICS.  Hall next turns to evi- 
dence using data from the LRD on plant-level gross employment reduc- 
tions.  These  data seem to show that in the recession  of the early 1980s 
there was a substantial increase in gross employment reductions that di- 
minished only slowly during the recovery  in the mid- to late 1980s. This 
evidence  comes  only  from plants where  employment  fell  and misses 
job loss in plants where overall employment  grew. This may or may not 
be a problem. But the coverage  is only manufacturing. And this could 
prove problematic as Hall uses these data later to explain labor force sta- 
tus changes  (leaving  of  employment)  for the entire labor force.  Why 
should  changes  in manufacturing employment  (which  is substantially 
less  than one-quarter of total employment)  explain overall labor force 
changes? 
Now  Hall runs a regression of his own.  He regresses  the new unem- 
ployment rate from the CPS (workers unemployed less than five weeks 
divided by the civilian labor force) by cause of separation on the current 
and seven lagged values of gross employment reductions in manufactur- 
ing with seasonal  dummies.  This is done  quarterly from  1978 through 
1988, and there are forty-four observations.  Hall focuses  particularly on 
the permanent layoff regression,  noting that the lags have fairly large ef- 
fects even seven years out. However,  no standard errors are presented 
so it is simply impossible  to judge how much credence  I should put on 
his evidence.  I do not have much confidence  that estimating seven  lags 
from forty-four time-series observations  will lead to very precisely  esti- 
mated lag coefficients. Robert  E. Hall  261 
On a similar note,  the finding that a much larger fraction of the total 
amount of temporary layoffs occurs contemporaneously  than for perma- 
nent layoffs suffers from the lack of a measure of precision.  Note finally 
that the CPS data will miss short unemployment spells (workers who are 
reemployed or out of the labor force by the time of the CPS interview). 
A Model of Labor Market Dynamics 
In this section,  Hall uses  some  of the estimates  derived  earlier, to- 
gether with some assumed job finding rates that match unemployment 
rates, to calibrate a nineteen-state  Markov process.  The job departure 
rates used are calculated from cross-section  CPS tenure data on the ba- 
sis of strong stationarity assumptions  that are not likely to be satisfied. 
Given the rather terse presentation  it is difficult to judge how well this 
model fits the data, and I do not have much comment to make. It does 
capture a reasonable amount of the sort of dynamics that Hall highlights 
in his earlier discussion,  particularly the lagged flow into unemployment 
as displaced workers go through a sequence  of jobs and unemployment 
spells on their way to a new stable job. 
The Aggregate  Significance  of Job Loss 
In the final section,  Hall calculates the aggregate value ofjob  loss,  as- 
suming that all separations were inefficient. In other words, as Hall rec- 
ognizes,  the calculations  do not account  for any efficiency  gains from 
breaking a match where the worker was being paid more than his value 
of  marginal product.  The  calculated  losses  are very  large,  with huge 
spikes at the start of recessions,  but should I count all of this as social 
loss? 
Overall Evaluation 
Despite  my criticisms,  I think this is a valuable paper. Hall is simply 
unmatched at putting together information from a variety of sources  in 
an interesting way to make an important point in a convincing way. The 
central point, which I find compelling,  is that the initial surge ofjob  loss 
in recessions  can have important macroeconomic  consequences  far be- 
yond the contemporaneous  effect because workers will take substantial 262  Br-ookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
time to  settle  into new  stable employment  relationships.  This adjust- 
ment may take the form of a sequence  of short-term jobs,  either as a de- 
liberate strategy or as part of the search for a good match. And thesejobs 
may be punctuated by spells of unemployment,  contributing to a higher 
unemployment rate during the adjustment period. 
Finally,  I will make my pitch for a microeconometric  analysis.  The 
idea driving Hall's  analysis  is that workers  displaced  from long-term 
jobs  typically  do not find a new  long-term job  immediately.  They  go 
through a job-shopping  process,  perhaps including spells of unemploy- 
ment. It seems  to me that this phenomenon  is independent  of whether 
the job loss occurs as part of a sharp episode ofjob  loss at the beginning 
of a recession,  or is unrelated to any aggregate disturbance.  Of course, 
the speed of adjustment or of finding a long-term job might depend on 
macroeconomic  conditions. 
In the  end,  focused  microeconometric  longitudinal  analyses  of  the 
postdisplacement  experience  of workers who lose long-term jobs are re- 
quired. Such analyses  would provide direct evidence  regarding the ex- 
tent to which displaced workers do, in fact, go through a series of short 
jobs,  perhaps separated by spells of unemployment,  before settling into 
new long-term jobs.  Then Hall's  insightful model of labor market dy- 
namics, where sharp episodes  of job loss echo through time and change 
the dynamics of labor market adjustment, will finally have some direct 
support. 
John  Haltiwanger:  In reading this paper I felt how  an upstream pro- 
ducer of an intermediate product must feel  when  a new  final product 
emerges that uses  its intermediate product. There is a natural sense  of 
both anticipation and apprehension.  One hopes that the final product is 
a success.  One hopes  that the intermediate product contributes  to the 
success.  One hopes that the intermediate product does  not turn out to 
be the equivalent of the O-Ring. 
Any upstream producer of data that is used in this paper will sit up and 
take notice at this product, since this is a paper with a $76 billion a year 
answer.  This is the value that is put on the lost jobs  in the most recent 
recession.  Most of my comments are, ultimately, related to whether this 
is a reasonable calculation. 
This paper is a very ambitious attempt to provide a conceptual frame- 
work for understandingjob loss, and then to quantify the magnitude, dy- Robert E. Hall  263 
namics, and value of the ongoing process ofjob  loss.  I think the paper is 
somewhat more successful  in the second part, which focuses  on empiri- 
cal results,  than the first, which  develops  the conceptual  framework. 
There are problems with the second  part of the paper, but these  prob- 
lems derive primarily from the inherent difficulties in the first part of the 
paper in setting out a conceptual framework to understand the dynamics 
of job loss. 
First, consider the conceptual  framework. The difficult question ad- 
dressed  is what are the forces  leading to efficient  versus  inefficient- 
and, presumably,  excessive-separations.  I think the paper correctly 
identifies the wage determination process  as playing a central role.  In 
particular, it is argued that the key  aspect  of the employer-employee 
relationship  in  this  context  is  suppressed  renegotiation.  Suppressed 
renegotiation  may be  beneficial  in terms  of promoting  investment  in 
firm-specific  skills,  but may  have  adverse  consequences  in terms  of 
promoting  efficient  separations.  I think the  idea  that  something  like 
suppressed  renegotiation  is related to the  simple employer-employee 
contract that we actually see is probably right, but I still think this story 
needs further fleshing out. Even more important, the conceptual frame- 
work that Hall develops  is inherently incomplete,  given the ambitious 
goals of the paper. 
I think the paper ultimately seeks to quantify the extent and value of 
inefficient job  loss.  What is missing in terms of being able to generate 
such a calculation? For one, the framework provides no clear guidance 
on how to distinguish empirically between  efficient and inefficient sepa- 
rations. I will show that this means that we really cannot put a value on 
the cost of inefficient job loss. 
Second,  while market imperfections  in the labor market are obvious 
sources of inefficient separations, they are hardly the only ones.  For ex- 
ample,  market imperfections  in credit markets are arguably very  im- 
portant in this context.  Young small businesses  have disproportionately 
high failure rates and job destruction rates. Some have argued that this 
finding stems in part from imperfections in credit markets. 
The paper is also a bit weak on distinguishing between  privately effi- 
cient separations and socially  efficient separations.  From a social effi- 
ciency perspective,  one potentially important source of inefficient turn- 
over  is  government  policy  itself.  The  paper  discusses  the  role  of 
government intervention,  but the attention  is primarily on the role of 264  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
government in interfering with the employment-at-will doctrine that pre- 
vails in the United States. 
I think this is too limited a view of the role of government intervention 
in this context.  There are two broad areas of interest here. First, fluctu- 
ations in government policies are potentially important as a driving force 
of  the  continuing  reallocation  we  actually  observe.  For  example, 
changes  in the magnitude and allocation  of defense  expenditures  and 
changes in trade policy are sources of allocational changes that will in- 
duce turnover. 
Second,  many government policies impinge on either the marginal  job 
creation or the marginal  job destruction decisions  by individual produc- 
ers.  For example,  subsidizing  incumbents  in targeted industries  may 
yield too little turnover rather than too much, by allowing the least suc- 
cessful firms, that would otherwise close down or shrink, to survive. 
Some of the government intervention at issue here may reflect optimal 
policy.  For example,  the policy  changes  inducing reallocation  may be 
optimal responses to changing economic and world events.  Further, one 
might argue that the subsidization of particular industries may be based 
on the spillovers associated  with the production in that industry. In any 
event,  my point is that characterizing the nature of the efficiency  of the 
observed job loss necessarily involves  understanding the role of govern- 
ment intervention in the job reallocation process. 
The more general point of this discussion  is that in order to generate 
the calculation that is the objective of this paper we need a more compre- 
hensive  conceptual  framework.  We need a conceptual  framework that 
makes it possible to quantify the turnover that would emerge optimally, 
given the underlying forces  of changes  in taste and technology.  Based 
upon this measure, we could then take the difference between the actual 
and the optimal turnover as an input to quantifying the value of ineffi- 
cient job loss. This difference would reflect a myriad factors: market im- 
perfections  in the labor market (which are stressed  in this paper) and 
market imperfections  in credit  and product  markets,  as  well  as  effi- 
ciency-enhancing  and efficiency-reducing  government  intervention.  I 
think that it is clear that we are still a long way from being able to accom- 
plish this objective  of measuring the extent and identifying the sources 
of inefficient job loss. 
The second part of the paper quantifies the dynamics of job loss,  and 
assigns a value to the job loss. It makes a number of significant contribu- Robert E. Hall  265 
tions in this regard. First, the paper does a very nice job of relating the 
various alternative measures of separations.  Table 1 and the accompa- 
nying discussion  will become  a standard cite for how to interpret the 
numbers from a variety of sources. The difficulty here is that separations 
come in a variety of flavors. Some are separations from one-day or one- 
week jobs.  Others are separations  from long-term  career jobs.  More 
generally,  some are separations that involve  a match dissolution  while 
the job continues,  and others involve job destruction. 
The various sources and associated  estimates reflect different compo- 
nents of these  separations,  and the paper does  an excellent  job  of ex- 
plaining why these  numbers are different.  I have found myself  on the 
phone a number of times with reporters asking me to compare the job 
destruction  measures,  for example,  to the displacement  numbers. The 
next time a reporter calls, I am going to keep this paper by my side. 
There are some  puzzles  in the comparisons  of the numbers in table 
1 that remain unresolved.  For example,  the limited evidence  available 
suggests that approximately 40 percent of all separations are associated 
with direct employment-to-employment  transitions.1 The line labeled 
"CPS tenure  survey,  1981" in table  1 includes  direct employment-to- 
employment transitions, while the "All separations, Current Population 
Survey" line is a bit mislabeled since it does not include separations re- 
sulting in a direct employment-to-employment  transition.  Beyond  the 
labeling problem, these two estimates are not consistent  with the 40 per- 
cent figure indicated above  (the job loss  rate for the "All Separations" 
line should only be about 60 percent of that of the "tenure survey" line). 
The paper makes the suggestion that this reflects the high frequency of 
turnover in the measure based upon the monthly CPS (the "All separa- 
tions" measure).  This may be the means for reconciliation,  but it re- 
quires verification. 
A second,  related, contribution of the paper is the evidence  on labor 
market dynamics. Many of us who work with these numbers have calcu- 
lated that about a third to a half of all job separations are due to job de- 
struction.2 A major point of this paper is that this is only part of the story, 
since job  destruction  begets  further job  separations.  Workers whose 
jobs  are destroyed  seek  new  matches,  and by their very  nature, new 
1.  Davis and Haltiwanger (1995). 
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matches are subject to higher match termination rates than the typical 
match. 
The paper provides some quite striking evidence  on these dynamics, 
showing that an impulse in job destruction  yields persistent  rebuilding 
of employment relationships for several years. This finding is significant 
for a number of reasons. First, it means that the cumulative contribution 
ofjob  destruction to total separations is larger than the one-third to one- 
half calculation discussed  above. 
Second,  this finding suggests that the process whereby permanent job 
destruction  begets  further employment  losses  for several periods  may 
be an important part of persistence  that we observe in aggregate fluctua- 
tions. There is no shortage of candidate explanations of this persistence. 
But they have generally been viewed as unsuccessful  or incomplete be- 
cause  they  can only  account  quantitatively  for relatively  short reces- 
sions. The long laundry list of factors includes adjustment costs,  inven- 
tory dynamics,  investment dynamics, price stickiness;  if I have omitted 
your pet theory, "just fill in the blanks." 
While this approach looks more promising in terms of accounting for 
recessions  that last for significant periods of time, a number of questions 
remain open.  Of particular interest here is why we observe  the burst of 
permanent-and  it is important to  emphasize  the permanent  compo- 
nent-job  destruction  at the  onset  of  recessions.  There  have  been  a 
number of recent attempts to explain the connection  between  restruc- 
turing and recessions.  Here I have in mind the work of Ricardo Cabal- 
lero, Mohammed Hammour, Dale Mortensen, and Chris Pissarides, the 
work I have done with Steve Davis,  and actually,  Hall's NBER Macro- 
economics  Annual paper that was originally (and still should be) titled, 
"Recessions  as Reorganizations."3 But this literature is still very much 
in its infancy. 
Finally, we return to the $76 billion answer. The paper acknowledges 
that this cannot be interpreted as a measure of the cost (private or social) 
ofjob loss. The statement is made that this is an upper bound on the cost 
of job loss that holds only if all the separations are inefficient.  Here we 
are back to the problem that the framework provides no clear guidance 
about how to decompose  the observed job loss into efficient and ineffi- 
cient separations. 
3.  Hall (1991). Robert E. Hall  267 
However,  there are additional important problems with this calcula- 
tion, including the fact that it depends on the time series of total compen- 
sation. To generate this measure of the value of the job loss one multi- 
plies the amount of what is denoted significant job loss by the number of 
earnings years lost as a result of that job loss times total compensation. 
Given the total compensation  growth over this period, the value associ- 
ated with the job loss grows over time. 
The problem is that the growth in total compensation  itself reflects the 
gains from the process  of reallocating  resources  through job  creation 
and job destruction.  One of the key results that has emerged from the 
work using the plant-level productivity data from the Census Bureau is 
that an important source of aggregate productivity growth is the reallo- 
cation of resources  away from the less  productive  plants to the more 
productive plants. Here I have in mind the work of Martin Baily, Chuck 
Hulten, and David Campbell, as well as some of the more recent work I 
have done with Martin Baily and Eric Bartelsman. 
The  growth  in  total  compensation  used  in this  paper  reflects  the 
growth in productivity associated  with the reallocation of resources.  It 
is a bit strange to use total compensation in calculating the cost of thejob 
loss when the measure of compensation  itself is affected by the ongoing 
process  of job reallocation of which the job loss is an integral part. Put 
differently, since we know that the less productive jobs are the ones de- 
stroyed,  we need to take this into account  in generating the associated 
costs. 
It is important to emphasize that this is not just a problem of trying to 
evaluate the net gain or loss from the process  of reallocation.  The gross 
cost of the job loss must also be evaluated at the appropriate compensa- 
tion for the lost jobs.  Lost jobs are from the lower tail of the productivity 
(and thus compensation)  distribution, and this needs to be taken into ac- 
count. 
To sum up, this paper asks virtually all of the right questions about job 
loss. Further, it makes clear that the development  of the various longitu- 
dinal worker and establishment databases allows us to investigate these 
questions in ways that were not possible before. Nevertheless,  it leaves 
the impression that we have a long way to go in developing  the appro- 
priate comprehensive  framework, both theoretically and empirically, to 
answer the questions of interest. 268  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,  1:1995 
General  Discussion 
George Perry emphasized  that the relevance  of Hall's results to the 
dynamics  of recessions  depends  on the macroeconomic  paradigm. On 
the real business cycle paradigm, which does not allow for product mar- 
ket disequilibrium or labor market failures,  the job loss  dynamics  and 
associated  movements  in aggregate output and unemployment  are part 
of  the  efficient  reallocation  of  resources  in response  to  productivity 
shocks.  By  contrast,  from a neo-Keynsian  perspective  aggregate de- 
mand determines aggregate output and employment,  and Hall'sjob  loss 
dynamics  describe  how  the  economy  allocates  scarce jobs.  William 
Nordhaus noted that, in addition to being silent on which of these para- 
digms is most accurate, the paper also leaves unexplained the sources of 
the initial shock to jobs that precipitates a recession. 
A number of participants questioned  Hall's  measure of the costs  of 
job loss.  Robert Gordon argued that many job losses,  such as those due 
to plant closing and relocations,  are unavoidable.  He wondered whether 
Hall's numbers contain much information beyond that provided by the 
level and change in the unemployment  rate. Hall responded that the ra- 
tio of temporary layoff unemployment  to total unemployment  has de- 
creased dramatically in the past decade,  so that a given increase in un- 
employment  is  now  more  costly  than  before.  Ricardo  Caballero 
suggested evaluating the social costs of job loss rather than just the cost 
to  employer  and  worker.  Costs  are  also  borne  by  the  government 
through lower revenue  and higher expenditures  for unemployment  in- 
surance and social welfare. Nordhaus pointed out that a complete  reck- 
oning of the costs  of job loss  should take into account  how people  use 
the time spent not working. Joel Slemrod suggested that the reduction in 
the value of job-specific  human capital was an important component  of 
the welfare cost ofjob  loss, but since these costs also apply to the move- 
ment of workers between jobs within firms, they would be hard to mea- 
sure in the aggregate. Nordhaus observed  that the losses  of labor esti- 
mated  by  Hall  seem  inconsistent  with  the  costs  of  recessions  as 
measured by the Okun gap. According to Hall's calculations,  the costs 
ofjob  loss in excess  of the norm totaled around $35 billion between  1979 
and 1982. The shortfall of GDP from potential over that period totaled 
$250 billion, which translates into a $200 billion shortfall in national in- Robert E. Hall  269 
come. Assuming that the loss is distributed among after-tax profits, pro- 
prietor's income,  and labor, in proportion to their shares of national in- 
come-the  nonlabor share,  in fact,  falls more than proportionately  in 
recessions-labor  suffered a loss  of something  like $125 billion of in- 
come.  This is more than triple the size of Hall's figure. Hall thought the 
difference  arose because  recessions  have effects  on workers'  incomes 
beyond the effects through layoffs measured by the PSID, which under- 
lie his calculations. 
Margaret Blair and Nordhaus  took issue  with Hall's  view  that sup- 
pression of renegotiation because ofjob-specific  human capital rational- 
ized  layoffs  and was  nonetheless  an optimal arrangement.  Blair sug- 
gested that if firm-specific investment by employees  is really important, 
use of labor contracts that include profit sharing would deal more effi- 
ciently with the problem. Nordhaus noted that other common features 
of contracts, such as the fact that they are almost always written in nomi- 
nal rather than real terms,  suggest  that most  contracts  are not  con- 
strained optimal arrangements. Hall responded that firms do write con- 
tingent contracts,  sometimes  very  elaborate  ones,  but only  when  the 
contingencies  are observable.  He felt that unobservability probably ex- 
plains the failure to use contingent  contracts  in most instances.  As an 
example,  he noted that law firms fire highly qualified associates  who do 
not become  partners. Yet a convincing  case has been made that, given 
asymmetric information about an associate's  investment in job-specific 
human capital, this is actually the best way to run law firms. Further- 
more, he argued that it would be meaningless  to link the compensation 
of one lawyer to the profits of the whole  firm. Any suitable contingent 
contract would have to link compensation  more closely  to the lawyer- 
client relationship; but this variable is relatively unobservable  and too 
qualitative in nature to embody  in a formal contract.  Nordhaus,  how- 
ever, warned against inferring much about the general labor market from 
the high-skilled professions  such as law and economics,  and about the 
optimality of cyclical layoffs from the structure of contracts over the life 
cycle of careers in such professions. 
Paul Romer questioned  whether parties can commit themselves  not 
to renegotiate.  Theory suggests that it is difficult to find mechanisms to 
force parties to keep their promises after they have obtained what they 
wanted. But Hall responded that although it may be hard to model theo- 
retically, institutions that are effective  at evoking commitment have, in 270  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
fact, developed.  Firms routinely follow  through on promises.  There is 
no obvious  commitment  mechanism  for the Fed,  but they  would  not 
dream of  taking advantage  of  their second  mover  position.  He  con- 
cluded that, because games are repeated and reputation is so important, 
and for other reasons that outstrip our current understanding, effective 
commitment is a common feature of market economies. 
Several  comments  centered  on empirical evidence  on the suppres- 
sion of renegotiation. Slemrod suggested that it would be useful to exam- 
ine how layoffs,  firing, and wage cuts differed for jobs and occupations 
with different job-specific  human capital content.  William Brainard and 
Hall mentioned  the  work of Truman Bewley,  who  interviewed  firms 
about their hiring and firing behavior.  Bewley's  surveys  indicate that 
"everyone in the labor market knows" that cutting wages destroys  mo- 
rale and damages a firm's reputation unless it can be persuasively  dem- 
onstrated that the firm is in deep financial difficulty. Cutting wages  be- 
cause  cheaper labor is available,  or because  labor is worth less  to the 
firm, is incendiary. The importance of making a credible case that cuts 
are driven by necessity  is clear from the prevalent view of managers that 
if they cut workers' pay, management should take cuts as well. 
Discussion  turned to  how  Hall's  paper relates  to  business  cycles. 
Daniel Sichel pointed out that the cyclical pattern of output is quite dif- 
ferent than the pattern of job  loss.  Excepting  the last recovery,  time- 
series evidence indicates that output recovers rapidly; the economy typ- 
ically climbs from its trough to its prior peak in two quarters. The pattern 
of large job loss followed  by a drawn-out period of job recovery implies 
dramatic changes in productivity during the recovery. 
Several panelists contrasted American with European and Japanese 
labor market experience.  Richard Cooper observed  that the turnover 
figures in table  1 are staggeringly high compared to those of European 
countries.  European unemployment  rates are high, but flows into and 
out of employment  are lower.  Hall suggested  that temp agencies,  day 
work, and very short-term contract work are much less important in Eu- 
ropean and Japanese labor markets, in part, at least, because of govern- 
ment policy.  While a calculation  of the costs  of job  loss  using Hall's 
methodology  would be much lower in Europe than in the United States, 
Cooper stated that economists  generally believe  that the lack of turn- 
over is a disadvantage for Europe,  reducing productive  labor realloca- 
tion. Hall concurred, arguing that the institution of the short job adds to Robert E. Hall  271 
the efficiency of the U. S. labor market. However,  if the reallocation of 
labor from nonproductive to productive pursuits is an important part of 
productivity growth,  as John Haltiwanger suggests,  the absence  of ef- 
fective  internal labor markets would make it difficult to explain the high 
productivity growth in Japan. This suggests,  Brainard and Hall argued, 
that within-firm labor markets in Europe  and Japan may accomplish 
much of the allocation of labor that involves  changing employers  in the 
United  States. 272  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
References 
Anderson,  Patricia M.,  and Bruce  D.  Meyer.  1994. "The Extent  and Conse- 
quences of Job Turnover." BPEA, Microeconomics,  1994, 177-236. 
Bewley,  Truman F.  1994. "A Field Study on Downward  Wage Rigidity." Un- 
published paper. Yale University. 
Blanchard, Olivier Jean, and Peter Diamond.  1990. "The Cyclical Behavior  of 
the Gross Flows of U.S.  Workers." BPEA, 2:1990, 85-14g. 
Carmichael,  H.  Lorne.  1984. "Reputations  in the  Labor Market." American 
Economic Review 74(4):713-25. 
Clark, Kim B., and Lawrence H. Summers. 1979. "Labor Market Dynamics and 
Unemployment:  A Reconsideration."  BPEA, 1:1979, 13-60. 
Davis, Steven J., and John C. Haltiwanger. 1995. "Measuring Gross Worker and 
Job Flows."  Working Paper 5133.  Cambridge,  Mass.:  National  Bureau of 
Economic  Research (May). 
Davis, Steven J., John C. Haltiwanger, and Scott Schuh. 1995. Job Creation and 
Destruction.  Washington: Department of Commerce,  Bureau of the Census, 
Center for Economic  Studies. 
Devine,  Theresa J., and Nicholas  M. Kiefer.  1991. Empirical Labor Economics: 
The Search Approach. New York: Oxford University  Press. 
Farber, Henry S. 1993. "The Incidence and Costs of Job Loss:  1982-9 1  ." BPEA, 
Microeconomics,  1993, 73-119. 
Fischer,  Stanley.  1980. "Dynamic Inconsistency,  Cooperation and the Benevo- 
lent Dissembling Government." Journal of Economic Dynamics  and Control 
2(1):93-107. 
Fudenberg,  Drew,  and Jean Tirole.  1991. Game  Theory. Cambridge,  Mass.: 
MIT Press. 
Gilson,  Ronald J.,  and Robert H.  Mnookin.  1990. "The Implicit Contract for 
Corporate Law Firm Associates:  Ex Post Opportunism and Ex Ante Bond- 
ing." In The Firm as a Nexus  of Treaties, edited by Masahiko Aoki, Bo Gus- 
tafsson,  and Oliver E. Williamson. London: Sage Publications. 
Hall, Robert E. 1991. "Labor Demand, Labor Supply, and Employment Volatil- 
ity." In NBER Macroeconomics  Annual 1991, edited by Olivier Jean Blanch- 
ard and Stanley Fischer,  17-46. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Hall, Robert E.,  and Edward P. Lazear.  1984. "The Excess  Sensitivity  of Lay- 
offs and Quits to Demand." Journal of Labor Economics  2(2):233-57. 
Hall, Robert E., and David M. Lilien. 1979. "Efficient Wage Bargains under Un- 
certain Supply and Demand." American Economic Review 69(5):868-79. 
Hashimoto,  Masanori,  and Ben  T.  Yu.  1980. "Specific  Capital, Employment 
Contracts, and Wage Rigidity." Bell Journal of Economics  11(2):536-49. 
Heckman, James J., and Burton Singer, editors.  1985. Longitudinal Analysis of 
Labor Market Data.  New  York: Cambridge University  Press. 
Kahn, Charles, and Gur Huberman. 1988. "Two-Sided Uncertainty and 'Up-or- 
Out' Contracts." Journal of Labor Economics  6(4):423-44. Robert E. Hall  273 
McLaughlin,  Kenneth J.  1991. "A Theory of Quits and Layoffs  with Efficient 
Turnover." Journal of Political Economy 99(1): 1-29. 
Polinsky,  A.  Mitchell.  1983. An Introduction to Law and Economics.  Boston: 
Little, Brown. 
Ruhm, Christopher J.  1991. "Are Workers Permanently  Scarred by Job Dis- 
placements?" American Economic Review 81(1):319-24. 
Topel, Robert. 1990. "Specific Capital and Unemployment:  Measuring the Costs 
and Consequences  of Job Loss."  Carnegie-Rochester  Conference Series on 
Public Policy 33:181-214. 
U.S.  Bureau of Labor Statistics.  l983. Job Tenure and Occupational  Change, 
1981. Special  Labor Force  Report, Bulletin 2162. Washington: Department 
of Labor. 
. 1994. "Worker Displacement  During the Early  1990s." USDL  94-434 
(September). Washington: Department of Labor. 